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Chapter 1
Introduction: Income Inequality and Administrative Corruption
Corruption has been present in government institutions since ancient Greece. It is also
widespread around the world. There is a plethora of research on this topic, with many different
approaches. Most of the time, the term corruption encompasses different activities in the public and
private areas. In the first case, illegal activities involve a public official, while in the second case an
illegal activity is performed by individuals or companies that are not related to government. For this
reason private corruption is considered to be not as important as public corruption. However, in private
corruption, as in public corruption, a relation of power between the involved parts is present and its
development process is the same. Public corruption draws greater attention because the negative effects
of corruption are reflected in governments’ performance and development.
Some consider corruption in less developed countries as a means to obtain certain services. Leff
(1964) posits three basic arguments behind positive uses of corruption. First, Leff argues that corruption
is necessary to overcome excessive government requirements. Second, the payment made by
businessmen to corrupt employees reduces government transaction costs. Third, corruption creates a
social benefit in addition to serving as a mechanism for political participation in minority groups. In this
same sense, Leys (1965) with a moralistic approach argues that corruption is useful when institutions are
not efficient. In this case corruption is “greasing” institutional and bureaucratic wheels, helping to obtain
a service or paperwork. Still, there are more negative effects than positive. For example, Kurer (1993)
argues that corrupt officials have more incentives to create economic distortions to maintain their illegal
income by creating difficulties to obtain a service. In this case, corruption starts as an extortion asking
for money or favors to do what is essentially their job, making institutions inefficient and throwing
“sand” at the institutional wheels.
1

Many manifestations of corruption exist and sometimes is difficult to identify them. Bribery,
embezzlement, kickbacks, capture and diversion of funds, improper appropriation, and nepotism are
well known and recognized between individuals, but other situations such as favoritism, ghost workers,
or state capture can be difficult to identify. Despite the formal differences most of the time these
different illegal activities are all referred to as corruption in general. However, we have to differentiate
the types of corruption to better understand the causes and effects over government performance. In
addition to the types of illegal acts, the government sphere in which the act is done is different. If an
illegal act was committed to avoid or speed up a trial, it can be considered as judicial corruption. If the
corrupt activity was done by a member of the Congress, or by a politician, it is considered political
corruption. Finally, if it was committed by a bureaucrat it is considered administrative corruption.
In this thesis, I focus on the last type of corruption presented above: administrative corruption.
This kind of corruption is more frequent among ordinary citizens and is related to government officials.
One of its characteristics is the monetary amount obtained by the people engaging in corruption. The
terms petty, administrative, or street-level corruption are used interchangeably to refer to corrupt
activities in which common citizens deal with non-elected public officials instead of politicians.
Administrative or petty corruption is used in the context of relatively small bribes and refers only to the
size of each transaction and not to its total impact on government income (Scott, 1972). However,
sometimes the amount can be high. This type of corruption is easier to monitor through surveys at the
citizens’ level, and the Corruption Perception Index shows to be reliable over time. Administrative
corruption is the term I will use in this thesis.
Administrative corruption in Mexico has been a huge challenge for governments; its
consequences have a wide variety, such as poor economic growth, low development, and poor economic
investment. It also undermines the quality of democracy. From 2002 through 2011, Transparency
International ranked Mexico at the 100th of 183 countries that were monitored on how clean public
2

sector was perceived to be. On a scale from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt), Mexico received a
score of 3 in the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 2012). Many developing
countries also have been ranked with a high corruption level, most of them in Latin America and Africa.
Corruption can be an economic and governance problem, which is manifested in all development and
service delivery sectors (Spector, 2005).(International, 2012)
According to the Secretaria de la Funcion Publica (2008), it is easier to control administrative
corruption with anti-corruption measures, such as the elimination of unnecessary procedures that the
federal government instituted after former president Vicente Fox took office, simplification of payments
or paperwork procedures, and increasing government accountability and transparency. With
administrative corruption, governments can experience a large loss of revenues. In Mexico, the cost of
corruption exceeded $2,540 million in 2010, an amount that is equivalent to a yearly government budget
for a state such as Sinaloa (Transparencia Mexicana, 2011) which in 2010 had a total population of
2,466,036 (INEGI, 2010). To compare this amount, for the same period, the state of Chihuahua had a
yearly budget of $3,309 million with almost the same population (Chihuahua, 2011). .(Mexicana, Transparencia Mexicana, 2011)
In Mexico, all levels of government experience corruption. In 2012, an anti-corruption law was
approved by former President Felipe Calderon Hinojosa to be used only in federal public works hiring,
leaving out each entity or municipality. The U.S. Department of State states in its 2012 Human Rights
Reports: Mexico that in the last six years, Mexico’s SFP started 50,000 administrative sanctions against
public functionaries for corrupt acts but only 100 served prison penalty for their acts (U.S. Department
of State, 2013). However, public officials continuously engage in corrupt activities with impunity and
only few cases have come to trial, making corruption one area where the lack of law enforcement
considerably undermines the state revenue, development and performance. This creates other serious
problems, such as low foreign investment, poor economic development, and the necessity to raise taxes
on the middle and working-class people.(State, 2013)
3

Although one might think administrative corruption is less harmful than political corruption
because of its smaller scale. But its consequences can be worse. For example, think about a construction
permit to build a daycare. In June 3, 2009 in Hermosillo, Sonora, a private daycare with state-run
contract caught fire. The daycare service was part of the contracts given by the Instituto Mexicano del
Seguro Social (IMSS, Mexican Institute of Social Security). In this accident, 49 children between five
months and five years old died. The security norms that are supposed to be met by the daycare were not
according to the standards imposed by the IMSS law. The operation permit had been granted to a couple
of cousins of former president Felipe Calderon's wife, Margarita Zavala, and to a former high-level
official of Sonora government, none of whom were punished (Monreal, 2013). In this case, many
corruption types can be present, including administrative, judicial, and political corruption. Also, this is
a good example of how administrative corruption has a direct impact on citizens even when they were
not involved in the corrupt activity. There are many cases like this, such as the construction of a
freeway, a hospital, a school, and a drunk driver bribing an officer so that his or her driver’s license is
not revoked.
An important factor to be analyzed in relation to corruption is the income inequality experienced
by the country. Income inequality is high in Latin American countries (Morley, 2001). For example, in
Mexico in 2010, half the population was living in conditions of poverty, and the top five percent were
earning 52.7 times more than the bottom five percent from 2000 to 2005 (CONEVAL, 2005). Creating
huge differences among population, which can be reflected in the way of how some citizens comply
with government requirements. Thus, income inequality is not a small issue within a country that is
constantly fighting against corruption. However, ironically, corruption will not diminish if the inequality
persists. This is one reason to analyze the relationship between these two variables in order to contribute
to the available information about corruption and how to fight it.
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Analyzing income inequality as a cause of corruption is important even at the international level.
Mexico has ratified many international treaties against corruption which forces the government to
consider measures to achieve goals on those treaties. Furthermore, Mexico is a member of international
organizations, such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, among others. Those organizations set certain goals that
countries must achieve in a certain time frame. For example, the United Nations Development
Program’s the Millennium Goals helps member countries to implement measures which trigger
economic development and growth, including fighting corruption. The aim in this thesis is to analyze the
significance that income inequality has over administrative corruption because research in this type of
corruption has been scarce, compared to that on political corruption. Besides, it is an activity performed
by ordinary citizens.
1.1 DEFINITIONS
To better understand the analysis of this research some concepts must be clear. As stated above,
many types of corruption can be present in life. For this thesis, I focus on corruption in the public sector
that occur at the state level. Chapter 3 discusses why this thesis does not include the federal level
corruption. Corruption is commonly defined as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”
(Transparency International, 2009:14). Despite being the commonly used, it is not enough to define
administrative corruption. I define administrative corruption as follows: administrative corruption refers
to everyday abuse of entrusted power by low- and mid-level public officials in their interactions with
ordinary citizens.(International, 2009)
In the administrative corruption definition, the key element of “public official” is present because
without it the illegal act cannot be considered as administrative corruption. Public official is a term that
can have many different names such as public employee, public servant, government worker, public
functionary, bureaucrat, and so on. Maria de los Angeles Gual defines public official in the Gamboa and
5

Valdez (2007), Congress report as "Everyone incorporated into the public administration for a
professional service relationship and paid, regulated by the Administrative Law”. Her definition is good,
but not enough; she refers to professional service but there could be services that are not professional
and yet paid by the state. Luis Humberto Delgadillo (2001) offers another definition: he says that a
“public official is the characteristic given to a person who is performing a job position in favor of the
state”. His definition refers to any type of government employee, regardless of the level or position.
Still, his definition does not include monetary compensation. In Mexico, many laws make references to
government employees and what they have in common is the salary paid by government. Then, the
expressions public official, public servant, and bureaucrat can be used to distinguish a person that works
in any government level and receives a salary from the state.
1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS
Chapter 2 of this thesis reviews the literature on the relationship between income inequality and
administrative corruption. Furthermore, some considerations about administrative corruption are
provided. Later, the theoretical framework about income inequality and administrative corruption is
offered based on the institutionalist theory and its different approaches that can better explain this
relationship in the case of Mexico. Also, the hypothesis for income inequality and administrative
corruption is provided. I argue that income inequality creates opportunities to generate administrative
corruption due to expensive services and excessive government requirements.
Chapter 3 deals with income inequality and administrative corruption's development and trends
in Mexico. Also, a historical background about the federal government’s aims to fight administrative
corruption from 1982 to 2012 is provided, to shed light on the differences between federal and state
level services, monitored by Transparencia Mexicana. The division of these services helps to understand
the interest to focus on services provided at the state.
6

Chapter 4 presents empirical analyses divided in two major sections, the first section presents a
quantitative analysis of income inequality and administrative corruption. The second part conducts a
qualitative analysis of the seven a states to further examine the hypothesized relationship. It shows how
those states have very different ways to manage their economic resources and institutional performance
which can impact the income inequality relationship with administrative corruption.
In chapter 5, the conclusion to the thesis, shortcomings, further research and recommendations in
the topic are provided.
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Chapter 2
Income Inequality as a Cause of Administrative Corruption
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Literature on income inequality as a cause of corruption provides an overview of how this
relationship can work. Despite the fact that there is not much research in this area, the research that is
available provides a good overview to maintain the debate on this relationship. Authors use different
mechanisms to explain or assess the relationship. For this reason, I will discuss in this section literature
available on income inequality as a cause of corruption. This relationship is not only rarely studied by
researchers, but also hardly analyzed within a country. Its assessment can be different from crossnational studies.
In the second part of the chapter, I define administrative corruption with the intention to
determine the difference between the political (or grand) corruption and administrative corruption. In the
last part of this section, the theory and the hypothesis on this relationship will be explained.
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Husted’s (1999) article examines the impact of national wealth, income distribution, government
size, and cultural variables. He argues that income distribution and corruption have a difficult
relationship; on one hand corruption tends to widen inequalities, and income inequality tends to promote
corruption. The mechanism included by Husted refers to middle class empowerment, in which middleclass people have the possibility to fight corruption through social and civil organizations. His research
hypothesizes that the greater the income inequality, the higher the level of corruption. Although his
research found GNP per capita to be a significant factor for corruption, he states that GINI coefficients
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were not available for high income economies at the time he did his research. In addition, he states that
income distribution could be correlated to the level of economic development.
Eric Uslaner (2009) argues that corruption is rooted in income distribution inequality, making it
the perfect environment for illegal activities. He uses trust in government as a mechanism in which
income inequality and corruption are connected, creating an indirect path to corruption. The argument in
his analysis shows a cycle between inequality and corruption, which he calls the “inequality trap” (128).
The economic sources of corruption are negative for him. He posits that economic distribution, trust, and
corruption are sticky and do not change much over time. He also remarks that inequality does not affect
all types of corruption. He differentiates between grand corruption and petty corruption, the later is more
affected by income inequality. He argues that petty corruption does not enrich those who practice it.
Also, income inequality creates corruption in many ways. Inequality is detrimental to property rights and
enables the rich to subvert the political, regulatory, and legal institutions of society for their own benefit.
The author continues to explain how income inequality breeds corruption through clientelism and
patronage. Moreover, inequality leads to a low generalized trust in government that creates more
corruption. He argues that an inequality trap cannot be changed easily because it has other
consequences, such as feelings constraints, making citizens behave in a cheating mode against
government. His method of analysis was a multivariate regression on 85 countries, showing an
insignificant relationship between income inequality and corruption. In other models where former
communist's regimes were excluded, he found a moderate effect.
Other research in which this relationship is analyzed is called A Comparative Study of Inequality
and Corruption by You and Khagram (2004). The authors argue that income inequality leads to
corruption through some material and normative mechanisms, pointing out that corruption is a function
of motivation and opportunities in which the rich not only have greater resources to buy influence, but
can also employ legal lobbying, political contributors, and bribery to influence the law making process.
9

Their analysis includes the GINI coefficients available for 129 countries, the Corruption Perception
Index (CPI), and political risk. As control variables they use trade openness, natural resource abundance,
democracy, federalism, religion, legal origins, and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. Using an Ordinary
Least Squares regression, they found that in some models, income inequality has a significant
relationship with corruption. However, after controlling for other variables, this significance disappears.
All of these authors agree that economies in transition or less developed countries tend to experience
high income inequality, which in turn leads to corruption. Most of these studies analyze cross-national
cases, some of them with lack of information that leads to inconclusive results. They do not provide any
within country analysis. This thesis does exactly this with an analysis of the effect of income inequality
on administrative corruption within a single country, Mexico.
The replication within Mexico´s states, of the You and Khagram´s research was done by Salmón
(2013). The author does not find any significant relationship between the two variables although he does
not include many variables and gives justification to do that. With it, he only used four variables GINI
per state, Gross Domestic Product per state, government size (number of government employees per
state), and economic development measured with the income index provided by the United Nations
Development Programme in the Human Development Index report. For the methodology, he uses a
correlation analysis, he ran ten models in which the hypothesis was rejected, and only the government
size for the Federal District and State of Mexico were significant in the relationship. This methodology
and variable selection could be questioned, because he only ran a correlation analysis, besides uses GINI
coefficient and Human Development Index (HDI) indistinctly to compare income inequality among
Mexican states.
2.3

ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION
Corruption is a very difficult concept to define. Everyone lives it and perceives it, but it cannot

have a single and clear definition. There are many types of corruption. Since ancient times, corruption
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has been present in many ways. The word corruption came from the Latin word corrumpere, which
means to rot, deprave, or damage, and is an action in which at least two people are implied (Heroles,
2008). However, the best known definition of corruption is provided by Nye (1967) who considers it as
the abuse of public office for private gain. Another definition is given by Goldsmith (1999). He argues
that political corruption can be divided into petty and grand corruption. The former involves minor graft
by low level public officials, and also is known as administrative, petty or bureaucratic corruption. The
latter involves major thievery by political leaders. Sánchez (2012) also differentiates between political
and administrative corruption. According to the author, political corruption is committed by politicians,
while administrative corruption is only committed by bureaucrats. Thus, administrative corruption is
considered the illegal private gain obtained by government employees in exchange for a service.
Administrative corruption involves the public official or administrative government employee and the
citizens who are looking for the possibility to speed up or avoid some legal requirements to obtain
service. Civil society identifies public officials as the center of corruption, and there could be some logic
to this, because government positions, such as public officers, are used by politicians to pay campaign
favors which also serve as administrative cliques. Thus, commitment to perform a good job is
compromised (Sánchez, 2012, p. 20).
Administrative officials run the risk of serving clienteles and bureaucratic cliques through
administrative corruption. Cultural and family-related values are used to increase these illegal practices
among public officials with the aim to help obtain a service without following the rules. Sánchez (2012)
considers administrative corruption as the abuse of power constituted authority, because this kind of
corruption promotes practices which can harm the institution’s development and performance and is
considered a part of weak political systems, with low institutional development level, where legality,
responsibility, public service culture, authority, incentives and sanctions are not based on rule of law.

11

Moreover, corruption in its different manifestations is considered a peril to democratic regimes which
weakens the stability of a country.
2.4

INCOME INEQUALITY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION IN MEXICO.

The institutionalist theory explains how income inequality and administrative corruption can
operate. I focus on this theory, because it has approaches that can explain the hypothesis stated further in
the chapter. This theory helps to understand how government institutions are organized, their
institutional values, objectives, and goals to be a good government administration. Because
administrative corruption is closely related to institutional development, institutionalism can explain
why some people prefer to obtain a service trough corruption.

We can understand causes and

motivations in an institution which make actors engage in illegal activities. North (1991) argues that
institutions are the rules that provide low cost and incentive to decentralized decisions. He also
differentiates between formal and informal rules. The former are those established by the same
organization and the latter can be considered as cultural or traditional practices carried out
unconsciously in society. Moreover, some authors such as March and Olsen (1989) argue that these
rules are not formalized as law or other written regulations and are considered as routines, customs,
compliance procedures, habits, decision styles or even social norms. Institutionalist theory is silent on
the causes and consequences of political institutions; it considers the political values of liberal
democracy (Rhodes, 1997). Among the most accepted values included in this type of democracy is a
closely controlled government with professionalized government staff and personnel.
2.4.1 Sociological Institutionalism
Hall and Taylor (1996) states that sociological institutionalism not only defines normative rules
and procedures, but also moral templates that frame guiding human action. With this same idea, Rakner
and Randall (2011) argue that sociological institutionalism has a tradition in sociology which is
12

concerned with how collective institutions establish forms of social control over individual action. John
Meyer (2008) emphasizes causal structures rooted in culture being subject of different interpretations.
He makes an assessment of institutionalization through the four most important ideas causing stability or
change in modern institutions. First, modern state and society’s institutional models are created by actors
and participants that do not belong to the government. Second, the states and other organizations tend to
reflect institutional models in a standardized way with not only different resources but powers and
interests around the world. Third, institutions, states, and organizations have same models. Fourth,
institutional models can have strong fuzzy effects on the orientation and behavior of participants in
organizational life. Meyer's ideas are useful to identify that some situations are present in a different way
in Mexican institutions, which are providers of a service to citizens and is supposed institutions may
reduce transaction costs. It is becoming difficult for the government to change those models with
identified illegal patterns.
Institutional development and performance is an important way to understand how some
individuals behave in order to obtain a service, making these practices a constant and recurring action
that citizenry learn. When those actions are not efficient, with illegal practices such as corruption, they
continue over time making those practices difficult to erase or change from the system. Although social
control can be established as a cultural or traditional behavior, administrative corruption can be
pervasive.
2.4.2 Rational Choice Institutionalism
Hall and Taylor (1996) argue that rational choice institutionalism arose from the study of the
American congressional behavior to explain stability in Congress. They posit that rational choice
institutionalism draws analytical tools from the new economics of organization, emphasizing the
importance of property rights, rent seeking, and transaction costs to the operation and development of
institutions. The rational choice theory is mainly based on economic factors, to maximize scarce
13

resources. In this sense, both institutions and individuals try to maximize their economic resources.
Since corruption has to deal with the individual’s resources maximization, even though they are working
or not in an institution, this theory helps to understand corruption mechanisms.
The main argument for this theory will continue to be the maximization of economic benefit and
an individual’s motivation to behave in certain way. Still, public officials can be molded by institutional
norms. Public official have the voluntary decision to adhere to the institutional norms and values.
Additionally, public officials need to begin to learn the rules (formal and informal) and values within
institutions if they plan to succeed in their job (North, 1990).
I posit that opportunities and a set of incentives motivate corruption. This can work on both sides
of the transaction. On one hand, citizens have more reasons to offer a bribe when their documents are
not according to legal requirements. On the other, legal requirements can be excessive or expensive,
creating the opportunity to public official, in which by a rational decision, seek to maximize their
personal income asking for a bribe. Figure 2.4.2.1 helps to explain how citizens and public officials have
motivations to engage in administrative corruption. The low probability of being punished for
committing the illegal activity increases bribery between citizens and public officials.

14

OPPORTUNITY

OPPORTUNITY
Get faster service
No punishment

CITIZENS

Informal institutions’
norms
No punishment

ADMINISTRATIVE
CORRUPTION

INCENTIVES

PUBLIC OFFICIAL
INCENTIVES
Increase income
Institutions' high
service fees

Low income.
Obtain service paying
less.
Overcome or skip a
requirement.
Avoid paperwork

Figure 2.4.2.1 Administrative corruption incentives and opportunities relation between citizens
and public official.
In countries with great income inequality such as Mexico, people on either side of the income
inequality scale can engage in corrupt activities. For poor people, corruption can work in two ways.
First, the lack of opportunities to have a well paid job can make people look for other revenues through
illegal practices to cover their basic needs. Second, due to individuals’ rational choice, people prefer to
spend less money or obtain service in a more "efficient" way when the requirements are not met, such as
birth certificate and driver’s license. Furthermore, a request of service of basic needs, such as water,
energy, or car renewal registration requires one to present a property bill (proof of address), which in
most of the cases poor people do not have. Thus, their only option to receive public service or comply
with legal requirements may be to bribe officials in order to circumvent the requisite to present official
documents to obtain public service. On the other hand, for the wealthy people the economic position
they hold makes it easier to bribe officials to maintain their economic status, when dealing with
government officials to obtain operation’s licenses or services over other people. In the poor people’s
case, they will use bribery as a cheaper and fastest method to do paperwork; they are not using
15

corruption to increase their wealth, but to make things cheaper, faster and easier. Moreover, for workers
missing a working day doing government paperwork is more costly than the bribe they are giving. For
the wealthy people, corruption is a profitable business which helps increase their income, and greater
political influence. Following John Friedman’s empowerment theory (1996), low income people lack
social empowerment and job security, which will in turn lead them to look for other sources to obtain
basic services or avoid law enforcement through bribes.
For public officials, their opportunity to accept or ask for a bribe is higher when institution's
norms are informal allowing corruption cases, or when the punishment is not efficient. Also, public
officials try to obtain more income when the salary is low. Public officials can see the opportunity to
ask, in a polite manner, for a bribe when they know that services offered by the government are not
efficient, the paper work is tedious and expensive, or when the citizen does not have certain documents,
such as a valid driver's license or a missing car's license plate. In this last case, both sides of the relation
(citizen and public official) are trying to make a "good deal".
2.5

Hypothesis
In higher income inequality societies exist few rich people and many poor people, this difference

in the population creates difficulties for poor people to obtain an expensive service or comply with
government requirements legally. Also, rich people find motivation to speed up a government process or
to circumvent other requirements to obtain a service. From the above discussion, the hypothesis I posit is
as follows:
H1: Income inequality is positively associated with levels of corruption.
Income inequality creates in poor people the necessity to obtain an expensive service without
having all legal requirements in exchange of a bribe offered to the public official. For the wealthy,
administrative corruption is the opportunity to obtain the service in a faster way, avoid long lines and
lose time.
16

The analysis in this thesis can help to demonstrate that income inequality is an important topic
for governments in less developed countries. To reduce corruption levels, governments should pay
attention to income inequality, government services requirements, services and fine's fees to be
affordable to all citizens. Also the paperwork requirements should be clear, easy, and available for
everyone to avoid a shortcut through administrative corruption.
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Chapter 3
Income Inequality and Administrative Corruption in Mexico
3.1

INCOME INEQUALITY IN MEXICO
Income distribution is an economic topic related in many ways to government performance and

has attracted much attention in social sciences, including political science. However, many countries do
not have an equal income distribution, creating social problems such as poverty, low government
revenues, low levels of education among the people, and low productivity. Economic development is
meant to improve the well being of the majority of the population (Hernández, 2013), but is seldom
achieved in less developed countries. In his article, Hernández compares Mexico’s level of development
with similar countries such as South Korea and Singapore, noting that in 1950, those countries had lower
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita than Mexico. However, today the GDP per capita is almost
four times that of Mexico. Hernández explains that the growth level of those Asian countries was
constantly high while Mexico’s growth level remained stagnant for more than twenty years. This
stagnation resulted in less development and more poverty, and a wider gap between people with high
and low incomes. A pyramid with few very rich people at the top and many poor people at the bottom
would describe the situation well.
In Mexico, after the modernization process, poverty rose in most rural areas; also poverty grew
in some urban areas (Gil, 1980). Poverty by itself is difficult for government and rest of the population
to whom taxes increase in order to provide more social programs and reduce poverty. But when poverty
and administrative corruption are combined the problem becomes important due to negative effects that
can create together. Both issues are the most important topics in the agenda setting of Mexican
government. Moreover, the GDP per capita does not show the real income of the people. Nonetheless,
the Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL) reports in 2012
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that the country was experiencing a reduction in the inequality gap and that the GINI coefficient
decreased from 0.543 in 1992 to 0.499 in 2010. Another way to show unequal income in a country is
through the means of the income percentage difference between the bottom 10 % and the top 10% (see
Table 3.1 below).
Table 3.1 Income gap and GINI coefficient
Year

Income Gap

GINI

Percentage

Coefficient

1992

2412%

0.543

2000

2482%

0.553

2005

2224%

0.517

2008

2179%

0.530

2010

1919%

0.499

Source: The author´s compilation based on CONEVAL (2012).
Note: The income gap percentage is based on the net income average per household per quarter. The
GINI coefficient uses net income per capita for its integration.
Income distribution still is one of the main topics of interest and challenge for Mexico’s federal
government. Fernando Cortés (2010) explains that in 2002, even though the GDP per capita was lower
than in previous years, the country experienced a poverty reduction due to a more equal distribution of
the income. However, what we observe in Figure 3.1 is that the top 10% saw a reduction of their income
in 2008 just as the other categories. The year 2010 was a recuperation period only for the top 10 % while
the other groups maintained the same income level.
To understand Figure 3.1 better, we must keep in mind the population that is considered in every
decil. From the first to the third decil, there are people who live in rural areas and small municipalities,
comprising families of 5-6 members with very low income. However, this category does not just belong
19

to rural areas; sometimes poor people who can be included in this category are also found in urban areas.
From the fourth to the seventh decil, there are families who live in towns with 2,500 inhabitants and the
average household size of 5 persons. These people typically work in the industry for low wages, which
is mostly used for basic needs as food. In the eighth and ninth decil is the middle income class, living in
urban areas with higher incomes, and with the average household size of 4. They work as clerks,
merchants, vendors, sales agents, personnel control at the manufacturing industry and craft activities, in
personnel services and utilities, and as professional and technical workers as well. The last decil, the
tenth, features the high income class in which the families have an average of 3.5 members. Most of
these people are businessmen, government employees with higher job positions such as legislators and
ministers, prominent professionals, and associate workers in firms. In Figure 3.1 we can see the huge
gap between the tenth and ninth decil.
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Figure 3.1 Total current income household average in deciles per quarterly in pesos.
Source: INEGI, Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los hogares 2012 (ENIGH).
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Clearly, Mexico has a huge challenge in making income distribution more equitable. Since the
1980s, the country has been trying to reduce income inequality and succeeded to an extent in 2010,
thanks largely to government expenditure in social programs, rather than more even income distribution.
In 1990, government expenditure on social programs was about six percent and in 2010 it was about 11
percent, with the new social policy that transfers economic aid to the vulnerable population (Cortés,
2013). However, there is still a huge income gap between the upper class and the middle class, or the
tenth and ninth decils; but the most important difference is between the upper class and the low income
class which is enormous. The 2013 report for poverty and income inequality, CONEVAL shows how
the percentage of vulnerable population by income rose from 5.9 percent in 2010 to 6.2 percent in 2012
(CONEVAL, 2013).
3.2

ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION IN MEXICO
Mexico has experienced some structural, economic, and political changes over the last decade

which contributed to its economic development. However, corruption has always been present and has
had a direct impact on the country´s development and performance. Some of those changes are related to
how things should be done in the country, requiring excessive paper work. This complexity contributes
to illegal activities. Many of the government requirements for service, or a permit to do something, is
complicated when complying with the law. This motivates certain people to circumvent the legal
process and do it through illegal means, generating corruption. Institutions make corruption an ordinary
and frequent practice among citizens. Mexico is a country with low transparency. According to
International Transparency (2013), it has low corruption enforcement and low control of corruption,
which in combination is the perfect environment for some people to do business in an illegal way.
Corruption has been analyzed from different approaches and researchers concur that this practice
erodes democratic state performance. Corruption is rooted in government practices but at the same time
citizens have direct impact over it, because corruption is used to obtain some benefits, such as services,
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permits, or even avoid paying a fine. Some authors such as Tomasini (2003) argue that corruption is an
evil with many manifestations, and is difficult to combat with only one action; so it has to be attacked on
different fronts. Between those actions, the author emphasizes the political actions to fight corruption as
the most important because decisions are made in government and political elites. In Mexico, over time,
individual corruption evolved in to a systematic administrative corruption and in some cases "hypercorruption"(Sánchez, 2012). Hyper-corruption does not change the meaning of corruption; it only makes
reference to the magnitude of illegal practices which Moreno (1993) differentiates as a generalized and
systematic corruption.
Since the 1980s, many anticorruption institutions have been created to fight administrative
corruption without success. The hegemonic party the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) used
anticorruption discourses to maintain the party´s cohesion. However, administrative corruption remained
as part of the government, and as a consequence, democracy could not be achieved. Sanchez (2012)
argues that where public administration is, there also is administrative corruption, particularly with
public officials using their position to obtain illegal gains. Moreover, he posits that governments must
work harder to cut administrative corruption and strengthen institutional performance. However, few
efforts were made by presidential administrations during the one-party period. Later, with Vicente Fox
and Felipe Calderon, there was an alternation of party from the PRI (Partido Revolucionario
Institucional) to the PAN (Partido Acción Nacional), with this shift some changes were made but they
were not enough to effectively combat corruption. The next section discusses these changes.
3.2.1. Miguel de la Madrid Administration (1982-1988)
Miguel de la Madrid received the administration with previous huge corruption scandals. Even
though he was part of the hegemonic party, his presidential platform was aimed to reduce corruption
perception with the slogan, “Society’s Moral Renewal.” His administration worked on three fronts:
prevent public official’s corruption; identify and sanction corruption; and reinforce national values to
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avoid corruption. These three actions required many changes of the public administration, including
legal changes. The national Constitution was amended in its title IV on Mexican Citizens, with the
intention to create the first law regarding public officials’ responsibilities. The same happened to the
national criminal code and Federal District criminal code. Finally, a federal agency, the Secretaría de la
Contraloría General de la Federación (SECOGEF, Secretariat of the Comptroller General of the
Federation) was created to investigate all cases related to public officials. This office had many internal
control instruments such as accountability (Sánchez, 2012), and due to the importance of administrative
corruption, it was in the government administration agenda to gain the society’s trust and approval by
fighting corruption.
This last agency, SECOGEF, has changed its name a few times. It was called the Secretaría de
Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo (SECODAM, Secretary of Comptroller and Administrative
Development) under President Ernesto Zedillo, and later changed again to the Secretaría de la Función
Pública (SFP, Public Service Secretary) under President Vicente Fox. The importance of this agency is
only at the federal level; it is in charge of all federal public officials’ performance. Unfortunately, most
of the corruption cases occur at the state level where this agency has no jurisdiction. However, it is the
only institution that imposes sanctions on federal public officials when they are caught in illegal
activities. Another benefit of the creation of this agency is that it gave more transparency to government
expenditure. Although the autonomy of this agency from federal government could legitimate their
performance and actions, it is still considered as not reliable in corruption cases
The actions taken during Miguel de la Madrid’s administration were intended to control more
public officials with informed citizenry that can denounce abuses by government officials. The efforts
were not enough, as Mexico was still in one party system with a less democratic regime where public
officials were not punished for illegal acts since all the legal system was subordinated to presidential
decisions.
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3.2.2 Carlos Salinas Administration (1988-1994)
During his administration, Carlos Salinas’ efforts were aimed to legitimize his government,
considering that his election was questioned with allegations of electoral fraud. The efforts against
administrative corruption were not as important as those actions taken by the previous administration.
The most important changes were the followings. First, amendments to the Law of Public Officers
Responsibilities were made in 1991. Second, the Administrative Simplification Program was published.
Finally, the Social Comptroller in the “Solidaridad” program was established. The last is the most
important action because it made the public resources more accountable. However, the administrative
simplification program was part of the modernization stage which was created in order to provide better
services to the citizens. This program, controlled by the Secretariat of the Comptroller General of the
Federation (SECOGEF), had five objectives: first, strengthen economic modernization of the country;
second, consolidate a public administration culture with efficiency and productivity; third, provide a
better service quality; fourth, give more transparency to government performance; and fifth, forge a
closer relation between federal government services providers and their users.
Regarding this last issue, the modernization of service providers included reduction in
paperwork. Government services started to ask for fewer requirements, in a clear, accessible and
simplified way, with modern and faster methods. Despite these actions, overall administrative corruption
did not lessen, but only increased due to some neoliberal policies, such as selling state owned
companies, where the public officials were the beneficiaries of the administrative corruption, and
businessmen also receive a share of the corruption (Sánchez, 2012).
3.2.3 Ernesto Zedillo Administration (1994-2000)
During his administration, Ernesto Zedillo gave orders to all federal agencies to strengthen
internal controls in order to reduce administrative corruption. Included in these efforts were some
changes in the public administration law of 1997, in which the SECOGEF could name and remove
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freely comptrollers in charge of auditing, and process complaints against federal agencies workers’
performance. With a wider set of functions the secretariat was able to increase control and prevention
against administrative corruption.
With these changes, the Secretariat of the Comptroller General of the Federation switched its
name to the Secretaría de Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo (SECODAM, Secretary of
Comptroller and Administrative Development). It performed three important activities: the inspection of
public expenditure according to the government budget approved by Congress, the establishment of the
law to audit federal agencies, and last, the registration of public officials’ property declaration. The
creation of the Programa de Modernización de la Administración Pública (PROMAP, Public
Administration Modernization Program) was another action taken by the federal government. This
program had two main goals: first, provide an effective public administration service to citizens; and
second, fight administrative corruption and impunity through preventive actions. It was necessary to
divide the program in four subprograms, such as citizen participation and service, administrative
decentralization, measure and evaluation of public performance, and ethics of public officers.
The creation of all these systems gave a basis to President Zedillo to start using internal control
systems inside the public administration. However, those systems were applied discretionally and not all
cases were sanctioned; impunity began to be present in the recently created institutions (Sánchez, 2012).
Moreover, sanctions regarding of administrative corruption were spread over multiple public
administration codes; with this, starting corruption process against any person was difficult. The
government’s effort to reduce corruption was not enough. Yet in comparison with the Salinas’
administration Zedillo's administration was more successful.
3.2.4 Vicente Fox Administration (2000-2006)
President Vicente Fox was the first opposition party government after the hegemonic single party
period. His rhetoric was always against corruption. For this reason, his administration started with the
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same enthusiasm as that of President De la Madrid. Fox’s administration was focused on fighting
administrative corruption, and made many changes. The five most important changes include:
1. The introduction of good public administration and honest government in the presidential
agenda.
2. The establishment of federal law of administrative responsibilities of public administration
officers;
3. The creation of the program against corruption to promote transparency and administrative
development;
4. The creation of the good governance index in 2001 based on the corruption perception index
developed by Transparencia Mexicana; and
5. The creation of three new laws: professional career service law, transparency and access to
public administration information law, and the public officer administrative responsibilities law
with an internal control approach.
The public officials’ law helped to create internal controls to professionalize public service with
transparency and accountability, and introduced the checks and balances system among federal public
administration. President Fox’s administration decided to fight administrative corruption, besides all the
normative changes. His administration launched a very strong program named “No más Mordidas” (No
more Bites) in which the Public Function Secretary (SFP, SECODAM in previous administration),
worked jointly to investigate all complaints against public officials. Unfortunately, it was not enough
and administrative corruption was pervasive. There was not only one corrupt political party but all were
corrupt (Rives, 2009).
3.2.5 Felipe Calderon Administration (2006-2012)
President Calderon’s administration did not have administrative corruption as one of his main
priorities and the lack of strategies against administrative corruption was the great failure during his
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administration. This administration was similar to that of President Salinas in the sense that both wanted
to legitimize their government due to the allegations of electoral fraud. In order to fix the lack of actions
against administrative corruption, the government announced in 2011 severe sanctions on private sector
members engaged in corrupt activities. The federal government also offered economic incentives to
snitches to denounce illegal activities. These two actions were a last moment announcement and did not
have an operational plan. Without an efficient law enforcement system to guarantee life or personal
security of participants, neither could work.
The change of the incumbent political party from the PRI to the PAN was seen by most of the
citizens, as the light at the end of a tunnel full of hope to fight one of the most pervasive evils in
Mexican governments. Instead, it brought more corruption. Yet, Transparencia Mexicana’s indexes
show that most of the corrupt activities happen at the state level. Federal government efforts to control
or diminish administrative corruption are not enough. Federal entities are autonomous in the use and
distribution of their economic resources obtained through services paid by citizens or state’s taxes. Most
of the federal entities lack corruption fighting programs and transparency laws as well. That is one
reason why federal government started to stress the governors to institute new laws to ensure
transparency and accountability in local administrations. To make a clear point about this situation, in
the next section I explain more about services measured by Transparencia Mexicana.
3.3 ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION IN MEXICO AT THREE LEVELS
Mexico´s has three levels of government: federal, state, and municipal. The country’s
administrative organization must be considered when we try to identify which services are monitored by
Transparencia Mexicana to be more corrupt. Transparencia Mexicana uses an index called Índice
Nacional de Corrupción y Buen Gobierno (INCBG, National Index of Corruption and Good
Government). The organization monitors 35 areas of service, of which only seven belong to the federal
public administration, 17 belong to state or municipal level, and six services can be done at both, state
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and municipal levels. Three services are not specified by Transparencia Mexicana's methodology, and
the last two services belong to the private sector.
3.3.1 Services Offered by the Federal Public Administration
The seven services managed by the federal public administration are: mail delivery, military
service papers, grants related to social programs, such as PROCAMPO and PROGRESA, get a passport,
obtain a credit from INFONAVIT, (worker’s loan to buy, repair or improve houses), reconnection or
installation of energy service (provided by Comisión Federal de Electricidad or CFE), and introduce
merchandise through borders.
These services are provided by the federal government throughout different federal institutions
located in every federal entity, based on delegated functions given by Article 124 of Mexico’s
Constitution. Its division is important because the Transparencia Mexicana Index only shows the results,
and if we do not know who provides the service, federal, state or local government, we may think that
all services belong to the federal government. Most of the services provided by the federal government
are showing lower corruption scores than those administered by state or local governments. The energy
service is perceived to be the federal service with higher corruption scores, and states are not authorized
to provide the service. In 2000 it was about 10.7 and for 2010 it reduced to 7.06, on a scale from 0 – 100
where 0 is no corruption. Perhaps, the ease to pay for the service indicates low perception of corruption.
Also, the federal government has the Public Function Secretary (SFP), the institution in charge of
complaints against federal employees, which sometime deter officers to accept bribes or commit other
illegal activities. This is one reason to focus in state level services where corruption perception is higher.
3.3.2

Services Offered at the State-Local Level
The state level services count up to 17 including: property tax payment, water utilities services,

water utility reconnection service, vital records, real property registry, vehicle registration services,
driver’s license services, other vehicle services, vehicle's emission verification, business licenses and
permits, construction permits, water supply by tank truck, waste services, work or sell on the streets,
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recover stolen car or towed car from city impound lot, park in disabled places without appropriate
permit, and avoid a transit ticket.
Most of these services are vehicle-related and show to have higher corruption perception scores.
In the list above they are ordered from less to more corrupt. The vehicle related services are managed by
federal entities such as driver’s license service, but other services such as transit fines correspond to
local administration. This thesis considers all of these as state-level administrative functions.
3.4 CONCLUSION
Income inequality, as shown before, is very important since a great part of population is below
the ninth decil and the gap between the tenth and ninth decil is huge, so we can imagine how colossal
can be the gap between the tenth and lower decils. It constitutes a perfect environment for administrative
corruption which aid lower income people to obtain services in a faster and cheaper way.
Administrative corruption has garnered attention by most Mexican federal governments, but with
no effective result. Moreover, administrative corruption is also considered less important than political
corruption. However, its reduction is critical for democratic consolidation. Regardless of the changes in
laws and other government agencies, corruption is still present and state governments do not see it as a
local problem. Some state governments use rhetorical speeches against administrative corruption but do
not consider real actions against this evil. Furthermore, state governments show, in the corruption index,
to have higher perception scores in vehicle related services. This is an important reason to analyze the
causes that create administrate corruption at the local level. To clarify this relationship, in the next
section the empirical case within a country will be analyzed.
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Chapter 4
Income Inequality and Administrative Corruption Empirical Analysis
4.1

RESEARCH DESIGN
The project conducted a quantitative analysis of corruption and a case study of a sample of

Mexican states to test the hypothesis presented in Chapter 2. For the quantitative analysis I performed a
multiple regression analysis on the Index of Corruption and Good Government (INCBG) as the
dependent variable. The independent variables include Gross Domestic Product per capita, government
expenditure, the GINI index, and the incumbent governor's political party. For the qualitative analysis, a
survey of web pages was conducted to find reasons why citizens prefer to bribe officials rather than do
paperwork. A comparison of legal requirements is also performed on the selected states.
In the first part of this chapter, I will describe the variables for the statistical analysis. I will then
discuss the results obtained in the regression analysis. In the second part of this chapter I will present the
matrix used to compare vehicle-related services offered by states governments. These services were
selected because they showed higher scores in the Index of Corruption and Good Government (INCBG,
Índice Nacional de Corrupción y Buen Gobierno), which indicates the areas of public service where
corruption is more widespread.
4.1.1. The Dependent Variable
As the dependent variable, I use the Index of Corruption and Good Government created by
Transparencia Mexicana. I refer to it as CPI, the Corruption Perception Index, in the subsequent
analysis. This index assesses the corruption perception among 35 government services, as explained
previously in Chapter 3. This index was created for the first time in 2001, and is available for the years
2001, 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2010; these constitute my dependent variable. Transparencia Mexicana
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measures the frequency in which Mexican households paid a bribe to have access to services or to avoid
fines. More than 15,300 households were interviewed in the country every year with available
information. The database reported that more than 200 million corruption cases occurred among
services1 in 2010 (Mexicana, 2011). The measurement scale is from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the
least corruption and 100 represent the most corruption.
4.1.2. Independent Variables
To measure inequality, I use the GINI coefficient for the 31 states and the Federal District
(México City) with a total of 32 states. The GINI coefficient measures income inequality in a society by
exploring the level of concentration, which exists in the distribution of income among the population.
The GINI coefficient takes values between 0 and 1 where a value that approaches 1 reflects greater
inequality in income distribution. Conversely, if the value goes closer to zero, there is greater equity in
terms of income distribution (CONEVAL, 2013). GINI in Mexican states ranges from 0.454 (Estado de
Mexico) to 0.527 (Oaxaca) with a median of 0.491. CONEVAL was used for the estimation of this
value, which utilizes information from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and is
based on the net income per capita.
This variable’s information was available for the years 2000, 2005, 2008 and 2010. For the panel
data set the information for year 2000 was also used for years 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004. The same was
done for year 2005, in which its information was used in years 2006 and 2007. The information of year
2008 was also used in 2009.
4.1.3 Control Variables
Government expenditure is used as a control variable, which often has significant impact on
corruption, because it does not distinguish specific resource allocation. Moreover, government size has
1

Transparencia Mexicana monitors 35 services of which only two services are part of the private sector, and the other 33 are
government services. See Chapter 3.
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an impact over administrative corruption since it has to hire more public officials (or bureaucrats) to
offer a good service to citizens, increasing opportunities to be engaged in illegal activities. This
information was gathered through the INEGI web page. The state and local public finances statistics are
in pesos per state. The data for the Federal District was obtained from the same source in the Public
finances of central government section for the Federal District, available from 1989 to 2012. For its
operationalization, government expenditure was divided by one million (gvm_1000000) with the
intention to eliminate the exponent number obtained in the regression analysis. This, however, does not
affect the interpretation of the result. The government expenditure per state, from 2000 to 2010, ranged
between $3,161 million pesos to $171, 651 million pesos. The variable was also lagged by one year. The
government expenditure per capita was also considered to analyze its influence in the income inequality
and administrative corruption relationship. However, models presented in this chapter do not include it
because this variable was never statistically significant whereas total size of government expenditure
was. Because of the limited sample size (N = 160), I opted not to include in the final models many
variables that are not shown to be statistically significant.
GDP per capita is another control variable that is common in corruption studies. GDP was
obtained from the INEGI web page; its value is in constant 2003 pesos for the data from 2003 to 2010.
For the previous years, from 2000 to 2002, the values are constant in 1993 pesos. This is not ideal, but
they are the only available information. The INEGI only gives the yearly amount per state, so it was
necessary to divide the GDP by population size to obtain GDP per capita. The population information
was obtained from the census in 2000 and 2010. I divided the GDP amount of every year by the number
of inhabitants. From 2000 through 2004, the same population numbers were obtained in the census.
From 2005 to 2009 I used the same population figure that was obtained in the year 2005 count. For 2010
GDP per capita I used the population amount obtained in the 2010 census.
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The shortcoming of using GDP per capita, for this research is that it represents "mean" wealth.
In Mexico, there exist few extremely rich people, as we have seen in Chapter 3, but there are also many
very poor people. The yearly GDP per capita average ranges from 6 to 511 thousand pesos among the
states during eleven years.
In this thesis, I also include a dummy variable that considers the incumbent governor's political
party for every state between 2000 and 2010. State governors’ terms are six years, and few states had a
political party shift during these eleven years. I include dummy variables for the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI, Partido Revolucionario Institucional) and the Democratic Revolutionary
Party (PRD, Partido de la Revolución Democrática). When the state governor's incumbent party was
from the PRI it has "1" and the PRD "0", the same was done when the state governor was from the PRD
it was coded "1" and PRI "0". The National Action Party (PAN) was not included, but it should be
understood that when PRI and PRD have a “0” value, the incumbent party was PAN.
4.2 STATISTICAL MODEL AND RESULTS
To test the hypothesis posited in Chapter 2, I used a panel data that include observations from
2000 to 2010 for each one of the 32 Mexican states. The variances in observations are expected to be
heteroskedastic due to multiple observations in the panel for the same states. To account for this
characteristic, I use an OLS (ordinary least square) regression with panel corrected standard errors
(PCSEs). A small number of key variables were included to avoid multicollinearity among variables.
Moreover, some consideration must be taken to reduce endogeneity problems. I therefore lagged
independent variables by one year.
The regression results for income inequality and administrative corruption are presented in Table
4.2.1. I ran two models. The first model includes all variables. In the second model GDP per capita was
excluded as a robustness check because of the data problem due to the different base years. Model 1
obtained an R2of 0.3523, Model 2 has an R2 of 0.3522, which means that the independent and control
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variables together account for 35 percent of the variance. Also, the relationship between GINI and
administrative corruption is positive and statistically significant. Its coefficient means that with every
0.1 point that GINI increases (more income inequality), administrative corruption will increase by 1.14
point for Model 1 and by 1.13 for Model 2.
Total government expenditure has a positive effect over administrative corruption. This effect is
expected, because larger governments create more employment of public officials and more
opportunities to engage in illegal activities, such as administrative corruption. It would be interesting to
examine disaggregated government expenditures because this could show which areas are more prone to
corruption.
Political parties in the two models are not significant, perhaps due to many states governors
alternation occurred after the 2000 federal election, where states experiencing alternation two times in
the eleven year period could not improve government institutions performance. However, an in-depth
analysis should be done to determine why political parties do not exercise statistically significant effects
in these models.
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Table 4.2.1 Income Inequality and Administrative Corruption Analysis

Administrative Corruption (CPI)
Model 1
Model 2
11.39***
11.31***
GINI
(4.8320)
(4.8230)
.00009***
.00009***
Gvmt Expen
(0.0000195) (0.0000196)
.0003
GDP pc
(0.0023)
.4496474
.4539905
PRI
(0.3585)
(0.3679)
.3152194
.3149568
PRD
(0.5189)
(0.5181)
N
R2

160
0.3523

160
0.3522

PCSE in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.3 CASE STUDY, VEHICLE-RELATED SERVICES IN SEVEN MEXICAN STATES
In this section, I undertake a qualitative analysis of corruption and income inequality. Through a
survey of state government web pages, many local and state laws were consulted to examine the
argument of this thesis. Two groups of states were selected for this part. In the first group, four states,
Chihuahua, Morelos, Quintana Roo, and Yucatan, reduced income inequality. The reduction was .0880
for Chihuahua, 0.1414 for Morelos, 0.0953 for Quintana Roo, and 0.1272 for Yucatán in an eleven-year
period (2000-2010). For the second group of states, three states where income inequality increased were
selected. Aguascalientes increased its GINI coefficient by 0.0526, Baja California increased income
inequality by 0.0599, and Coahuila increased by 0.0763 units.
I consider the differences in the GINI coefficient to compare if the reduction in inequality
reduced the corruption trends in the same period. Considering the levels of inequality and corruption
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does not necessarily demonstrate a causal relationship. A better test of the causal relationship can
therefore be conducted by closely examining whether reductions or increases in inequality led to
corresponding decreases or increases in corruption. For example, Oaxaca is the most unequal state in
Mexico, with an average GINI coefficient of 0.527 and also with a high corruption perception index
average of 8.8 units. Hence, the change in the GINI coefficient (independent variable) should produce a
corresponding change in the corruption perception index, as we can see in the selected states.
Three vehicle-related services are offered at the state level. One is the vehicle ownership tax,
registration renewal, and vehicle plate’s change. Even though the driver’s license is not a vehicle-related
service, it is a requisite to register and drive one; also the driver's license has a direct impact over the
vehicle’s fines. Vehicle fines are managed at the local level. For this research, the local transit law of the
capital city of every state was consulted. To make a clear and ordered comparison, I will first explain
how the procedure for the vehicle ownership tax, registration renewal, and change of car license plate is
conducted. Later, I compare the transit fines and the ease to pay them across different states.
4.3.1 Vehicle ownership tax, registration renewal, and license plate change.
The vehicle ownership tax and registration service vary among states. In some states, such as
Yucatan, Aguascalientes, Baja California, and Coahuila, the vehicle ownership tax and registration
renewal must be paid together. The vehicle ownership tax was levied by the federal government during
the last 44 years. This tax was collected to finance the Olympic Games in 1968; later the federal
government decided to keep it as a major source of tax revenue. In 2011, former President Felipe
Calderon announced that state legislatures could decide whether they would continue with this tax or
another similar tax (Ramos, 2011). For this reason, the difference in payment is considerable between
the states that already have this tax and those that do not. The calculation of the tax is over new vehicles,
up to ten years of use. In the case of Yucatan, the value of the car must exceed 300,000 pesos to pay the
ownership tax. The vehicles with a value lower than 300,000 pesos do not have to pay the ownership
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tax. However, the renewal registration must be paid with an amount of 1,407 pesos. (Yucatan, 2013).
Also, it is mandatory to have a car liability insurance in order to pay this fee. Here, administrative
corruption can be present, trying to obtain the service without the insurance.
In Aguascalientes, Baja California, and Coahuila, the ownership tax is managed in a way similar
to Yucatan. In Aguascalientes, the payment is for vehicles with a value of more than 300,000 pesos
(Aguascalientes, 2013). In Baja California, the value of the car must be lower than 100,000 pesos
(California, 2013). It is worth noting that only one car in the Mexican market is lower than 100,000
pesos: the Matiz from the General Motors brand (Motors, 2014). For Coahuila, owners of cars with a
value lower than 200,000 pesos will not pay the ownership tax, and those cars with a value of more than
200,000, but lower than 350,000 will pay only a 33 percent of the tax (Coahuila, 2013). Vehicles with a
value of more than 350,000 are assessed a full ownership tax, considering that only very wealthy people
can afford a tax of about 14,000 pesos every year. Despite the fact that wealthy people have to pay more
taxes and lower income people do not have to pay this tax, poor people still have to comply with vehicle
renewal every year with an amount of 480 pesos for Aguascalientes, 1,332 pesos in Baja California and
1,250 pesos in Coahuila.
For the states where the vehicle ownership tax is no longer applicable only the car registry
renewal must be paid. This is the case in the states of Chihuahua, Morelos, and Quintana Roo (states
with more equal income distribution). In each case, vehicle owners have to pay for car registration
renewal in the amount of 1,440 pesos, 687 pesos, and 769 pesos, respectively. Despite the fact that these
states do not have the ownership tax, as it was not imposed by the federal government, they have levied
other types of fees.
In the case of Chihuahua, this is called a "voluntary contribution" for infrastructure of freeways
and roads in the amount of 300 pesos. It is a part of the registration renewal. This "contribution" returns
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directly to every municipality regardless of which level of government is in charge of the collection
(Ramirez, 2012). However, the amount of the fee is very low compared to the ownership tax.
Mexican states require changes of car license plates. In the more equal income group, the states
of Chihuahua, Quintana Roo, and Yucatan require a license plate change every three years. The cost is
300 pesos for Chihuahua, 765 for Quintana Roo, and 220 pesos in Yucatan. In Morelos' case, the
amount varies according to vehicle type. If it is a recent model, the amount is 687 pesos, and if it is an
older model, the amount is 812 pesos. However, the government web page does not specify what years
are considered "old" models. The website also does not specify for how long the plates are valid. In the
other group of states, the amounts are: 360 pesos for Aguascalientes, 1,040 pesos for Baja California
(change every six years), and 300 pesos for Coahuila. The amount that citizens must pay in order to
change license plates are quite low, but in order to change license plates the ownership tax must be paid
and citizens have to show the proof of payment for the last five years.
In the unequal states group, the payment of the ownership tax and the car registration is every
year. They also have to change license plates every three years in Aguascalientes and Coahuila. For Baja
California, it is every six years. Thus, the amount citizens have to pay regarding to vehicle service is
high. According to the budget law of these states, owners of some new cars do not have to pay
ownership tax. However, some car owners have to pay the ownership tax, as a proportional part of the
value of the car with a yearly amount, which ranges go from 3,000 to 4,000 pesos depending on the car's
year (Fernandez, 2013). All states in this group offer a payment discount if it is paid between January
and March. Some of those discounts range between five percent in Baja California (Automotriz, 2010)
up to 75 percent in Aguascalientes (Aguascalientes, 2011). Also, to pay for any vehicle-related service,
it is necessary to have a valid driver's license. Illustration 4.3.1.1 shows the vehicular services office in
Torreon Coahuila during the first few days of a New Year, wherein many people showed up to pay
renewal registration with a 15 percent off discount (Redaccion, 2014).
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Illustration 4.3.1.1 Oficina de recaudación de rentas (levying of income office) in Torreón,
Coahuila.
Source: El Siglo de Torreón, 2014.

In Table 4.3.1.1 the amount paid by service per state is shown. The three right side states
experienced increases in inequality (referred to as “unequal” in the table). The table also includes
changes in the corruption obtained from 2001 to 2010, and the difference between 2000 and 2010 in the
GINI coefficient. All the states in the “equal” states group show reduction in the GINI coefficients,
indicating that the states became more equal in the income distribution. In this group Chihuahua was the
only state experiencing an increase of 1.6 units in the corruption perception index. On the other hand,
the unequal group experienced an increase in both income inequality and corruption. The table also
included if the states have transparency law. However, this situation seems not to have any influence on
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administrative corruption because all these states do have such law. Related to vehicle registration fees,
the states that reduced income inequality have a mean average of 953 pesos; while the counterpart of the
unequal states has a mean average of 1,021 pesos showing a slight difference of 68 pesos. For the car
license plate change, the unequal states group has a mean average of 393 while the other group is of 493
pesos, 100 pesos more.
The ownership tax, as I explained previously, is very expensive for some citizens to pay, even
though it is only a fraction of the value of a car. Some citizens therefore may not pay that tax one year.
However, if the next year they can afford that payment, they need to pay for the previous year first,
increasing the amount of payment. Moreover, if citizens have the opportunity to obtain the payment
document of both years at a 50 percent discount, through a corrupt official, they will take advantage of
this opportunity. In this case, the institution's weak legal system can allow employees to obtain an extra
earning without punishment.
The vehicle registration amount is cheaper than that of the ownership tax. However, a worker
earning the minimum daily wage will take 17 days of his/her salary to pay, in the case of Chihuahua. At
the same time, the owner also must pay for the car license plate. In addition, state governments include
other contributions, such as aid to the local Red Cross or the university tax, increasing the total amount
that must be paid every year during registration renewal. Many people make a huge effort to buy a car
because public transportation is expensive, inefficient, and insufficient.
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Table 4.3.1.1 Amount paid by service per state

Source: Ley de Ingresos para el Estado de Chihuahua, Ley de Ingresos para el Estado de
Morelos, Ley de Ingresos para el Estado de Quintana Roo, Ley de Ingresos para el Estado de Yucatán,
Ley de Ingresos para el Estado de Aguascalientes, Ley de Ingresos para el Estado de Baja California,
and Ley de Ingresos para el Estado de Coahuila.

For the driver's license paperwork most of the states offer the service at the local level, despite
the fact that this is a state government requirement. The valid period for the driver's license varies
among states. Coahuila is the only state offering more period options in the expiration dates. To obtain
this document, government requirements are different among states. Some requirements are the same in
all states, such as the presentation of valid identification and a driving exam. In the exam case, the only
state that requires bringing a car for the exam is Baja California. The prices to obtain a driver's license
ranges from 123 pesos for one year (Morelos) to up to 1,148 pesos in Yucatan for five years. The
driver's license prices in each state are shown in Table 4.3.1.2. The price can vary according to the
expiration period, but also the amount can be higher due to other taxes included in the service.
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Table 4.3.1.2 Drivers License Requirements and Prices (First Time).

Source: government web pages, paperwork and services.

From the previous table, every time a citizen does not have one of those requirements is an
incentive for the public official to ask for a bribe. The most common requirement to circumvent is the
driving exam, with an extra fee any citizen can get the minimum points to obtain the driver's license and
it is present in all the states requirements. It is worth noting that poor people are less educated and the
fear of not doing well on the driving exam is the incentive to offer a bribe to the official. Furthermore,
the proof of address is sometimes difficult to obtain, because the person needs to own a house in order to
ask for energy, gas, or water service which are the legal documents of proof of address and must match
the identification name and address. In many cases we can see that income inequality create differences
in the population, and in order to obtain some services, the poor people have to use bribery to obtain
services. Ironically, this is an illegal way of being legal.
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4.3.2 Transit Fines.
The transit fines are administered at the local level. Each municipality determines the amount of
every fine. I consulted the Ley de Ingresos (Income Law) for the capital city of each state, and the Ley
de Transito (Transit Law). The state capitals considered are: Chihuahua- Chihuahua, CuernavacaMorelos, Chetumal-Quintana Roo, Mérida-Yucatán, Aguascalientes-Aguascalientes, Mexicali-Baja
California, and Saltillo-Coahuila. The differences in the fine's amount between each capital city or
municipality is not much. Only the city of Merida has very high fines, considering that this is a touristic
place which makes it very expensive. In Table 4.3.2.1 the amount of some fines are shown.

Table 4.3.2.1 Common Transit Fines
Transit fines
Speeding
Drunk driving
Driving w/child in lap
Driving without or
suspended license
Superimposed car's plate

Chihuahua

Cuernavaca

Chetumal

Merida

Aguascalientes

Mexicali

(Chih)

(Morelos)

(Q.R.)

(Yuca)

(Ags)

(B.C.)

Saltillo
(Coah)

$
$
$

1,009
6,729
471

$
$
$

672
672
202

$
$
$

1,680
1,680
538

$
$
$

6,729
6,729
1,008

$
$
$

1,009
1,009
672

$
$
$

1,009
3,364
672

$
$
$

403
471
336

$

6,729

$

269

$

336

$

6,729

$

1,345

$

1,009

$

403

$

5,383

$

6,729

$

1,009

$

6,729

$

1,345

$

1,009

$

471

When driving tickets are issued by transit officers, they must retain any of three documents,
driver’s license, car registration or vehicle's plate (Estado, 2013), to guarantee the payment of the fine.
In the case that one person gets a speeding ticket, the driver's license will be sent to the local transit
police station until the payment is done. When a citizen transgresses the transit law and is stopped by a
transit officer, he/she prefers to give the official "la mordida" (the bite) rather than pay the fine (Ruiz,
2014). Once the bribe has been given, the obligation to pay a very high fine and the paperwork is
avoided. When low income people do not have the possibility to offer a bribe to the transit official for a
transgression to the transit law, a document must be retained until the payment is done. If the fine is
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expensive, the person will take a while to pay it, in order to recover his/her document, creating
incentives to bribe officials to avoid another fine or to get a vehicle-related service.
A transit fine can be paid in the transit office or online. Many people think that the process to pay
a fine should be easier in order to reduce corruption (Rebolledo, 2014). However, the culture and
traditions in Mexico do not allow traffic tickets without retaining a document. In Mexico, people are
compelled to pay transit fines only if a document is retained and the process to retrieve the document
from the transit office is tedious. Figure4.3.2.1 shows the process to be followed to retrieve the
document after receiving a traffic ticket. People must wait 24 hours because until the policeman shift
ends the document is delivered in the transit office to be processed.

Figure4.3.2.1 Document recovery process after paying a transit fine.

Several states’ web pages are not in full operation and some of them are under construction. For
the group of states that reduced income inequality, the survey of web pages to pay for car renewal
registration and transit fines is as follows. In the case of the Chihuahuan state government, the page
offers the renewal registration and transit fine payment. The local government's web pages are more
confusing and most of the time the information is not available. Morelos' government web page is under
construction and only offers information about "other" services (not vehicle related), and transit fine
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payments are difficult to process. The Quintana Roo government web page gives the option to pay
renewal registration but not fines or driver's license. The local government web pages do not include
transit fines payment; moreover, the pages are confusing. I consulted two municipalities in Quintana
Roo, one for the capital city Chetumal, and the other for Cancun, and found that none offers transit fine
payment. The Yucatan government web page offers car renewal registration payment and transit fines
payment for capital city, Merida, in a very easy and clear way.
For the other group of states, the survey of web pages yielded the following findings. In
Aguascalientes, it is possible to pay the ownership tax on line. However, regarding the transit fines, only
the local government web page gives access to pay them on line. In Baja California's web page it was
fast and easy to find a renewal registration and driver's license payment option, and in Mexicali the
government web page transit fines payment on line is also available. In Coahuila's government web page
you can find car ownership tax payment, and it can be done in monthly payments too. In addition, the
driver's license request is available on line, and the information was clear and easy to find. However,
local government web page, Saltillo seems incomplete, and only the property tax can be paid. The
screenshots of government web pages are available in the appendix.
The use of technology should help citizens to comply with government requirements. However,
some services are not easy to do or to comply with, creating incentives for citizens to obtain them
through illegal means such as corruption. In 2012, INEGI announced that 40% of population has access
to the Internet (INEGI, 2013). This is an opportunity for governments to offer better services reducing
the interaction between the public official and the citizen and hence corruption. Also, technology can
help government to increase their tax revenues, making services available for the most part of the
population. However, other problems should be considered, such as a reliable postal service, payments
through banks deposit, because a great part of population, particularly the poor, do not use credit cards.
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4.4 CONCLUSIONS
The quantitative analysis helped to show the impact of income inequality over administrative
corruption. Sometimes, the quantitative analysis is not enough to know the causes, and thus a further
analysis should be performed. The qualitative analysis of this thesis is not exhaustive and many changes
in prices amounts and procedures posted in states’ governments web pages can vary. Until someone
personally (not through web pages) experiences the interaction with Mexican government institutions,
related to paperwork or services payment, a better assessment will do.
Citizens must pay government fines in order to comply with law. I cannot suggest that
governments should reduce transit fines because they are stated as punishments, but some exceptions
should be consider to help low income people to comply with legal requirements. In services fees,
governments should reduce the prices to make it affordable for everyone. Many poor people prefer to
offer a bribe because the service is expensive or is difficult to obtain the requirements, such as the proof
of address. Also, governments may offer better and faster services, perhaps by sending the document by
a reliable postal service.
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Chapter 5
5.1. CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of income inequality and administrative corruption has been overlooked in prior
research, and is often difficult to assess. In this thesis, the quantitative analysis within a country was
useful for its assessment. Corruption has gained attention around the world; in less developed countries,
corruption is present due to problems such as poverty. However, in Mexico, few analyses about income
inequality and corruption exist. Yet, the government would be more successful reducing corruption if
income is more equally distributed.
The quantitative analysis showed a positive relationship between income inequality and
corruption within a country, Mexico. The available cross-national research in this relationship did not
obtain significant results, perhaps because it is difficult to have same characteristics among all the
analyzed countries. However, Uslaner (2009) insists how corruption is rooted in income inequality
creating the "inequality trap". Many factors can be included as a cause of corruption, such as levels of
education, economic development, and institutional development.
Some questions about the statistical results are important to discuss. GDP per capita was not
significant in the relationship. I speculate that in a society with high levels of income inequality, the
average level of wealth simply does not matter much. The other explanation could be due to the
differences in the data obtained. The total government expenditure has a significant relation to
corruption because sometimes the allocation of government resources can be traduced to administrative
corruption in large size governments. Moreover, administrative corruption is related to public official, so
more government expenditure increases the number of bureaucrats and officials in government services
with direct relationship to citizens.
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To answer the question about why political parties were not significant in the relationship, a
further research must be conducted. I think that this could be due to the political shifts suffered by states
when incumbent political party (PRI) changed to the PAN after the President Fox election.
The hypothesis in this research is: income inequality is associated to levels of administrative
corruption, and the mechanisms through which citizens prefer to bribe an officer includes difficulty to
obtain a service due to many requirements, and expensive services or in lieu of transit fines. Using
rational calculations, citizens weigh up the money amount and the time saved through a bribe.
The qualitative analysis helped to shed light on situations in which citizens, in spite of trying to
comply with laws, do not have economic means to do it according to the legal procedure, which
sometimes is expensive and delaying. Also, excessive taxes make citizens to obtain the service through
corruption. We can observe in Chapter 4 how the car ownership tax can be related to the corruption
indexes. The state of Morelos is an outlier in the more equal states; its INCBG showed to be the higher
with both groups it has an average score of 8.7. However, in the eleven year period it reduced the
corruption perception index. Moreover, the state of Chihuahua showed to counter the stated hypothesis.
It was the only state in which income inequality reduced and administrative corruption increased. As we
observe corruption indices, the question about how citizens perceive corruption in general can affect the
results in the index managed by Transparencia Mexicana.
Also, the findings regarding the state of Coahuila can be questioned. In this state, services do not
show an excessive fee; however, the corruption perception index difference is the highest. To explain
this, we can make a reference to the grand corruption scandals in the state government, where former
Governor Humberto Moreira had underreported its debt by almost 30,000million pesos and had forged
official documents to obtain loans (Aristegui, 2014). This probably influenced the perceptions of the
state residents about corruption in the state.
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For this thesis, I surveyed the Income laws of the seven federal entities and the lowest fine's
amount is between two and ten daily minimum salaries. The highest fine is between 20 and 100 days of
minimum salary, the case of Yucatan. The payment of a fine with very high amount, for example
speeding, sometimes is impossible for some citizens with low income. A fine that is not paid creates
problems at the renewal registration every year. Moreover, the retained document (driver's license, car
registration or license plate) is a cause to bribe an official because the citizen does not have it in case of
a transit ticket. The citizen’s intention to pay a lower transit fine turns difficult because he/she will not
be able to pay newest fine if the oldest is not paid first.
Officials know how expensive a transit fine can be, so they try to influence citizen's behavior to
obtain a bribe abusing the opportunity in which the citizen will decide the cheap and short way. The
institution's behavior has a direct impact over the employees. For many years the transit office has been
characterized by corrupt chief officers imposing a daily number of transit fines that police officers must
achieve (Mis, 2013), creating informal rules difficult to fight, even when new policemen are hired, they
already know what they must do. The citizens’ cultural behavior also is important in the administrative
corruption relationship but this is related to the inefficient law enforcement, citizens know that they will
not be caught or punished. Sometimes, citizens threaten police officers with denounce their corrupt
behavior when the former do not want to be sanction by the later. This shows poor authority recognition
to the police officers, making difficult to prove who is saying the truth.
5.2. FURTHER ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SHORTCOMINGS.
In this thesis, some limitations exist due to some information availability. Even though, most of
the information was obtained through government official web pages, such as INEGI, it is not consistent
to be used in a statistical analysis, which was the case of the GDP. The recommendation in this case, is
for the government institutions to offer statistical information in a clear, ordered and clean way more
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accurate and reliable. With it a better research can be done that could help to develop policies for an
improved government service.
In the states' governments web pages, the information should be understandable for everyone,
have to be clear and easy to find services. The income should be considered in order to pay services or
fines; however, this can breed impunity. The rules to reduce fines or services to poor people should be
stated with conditions for recurrent transgressors of transit law. Other important component posited by
Uslaner (2009) is trust in government. Many citizens do not trust in government and prefer to pay the
bribe because they know who will get the money, than paying to the government where other will steal
it, political corruption.
The information obtained from the states web pages is useful to know differences in prices
amount of the car ownership, fines, or services. Despite, this is not accurate information, in which
people can set the baseline of services fees. Most of the time citizens have to pay more than what was
declared in each state's income law. It is necessary to conduct a qualitative research to know thoroughly
the motivations of citizens and police officers to engage in corrupt activities. With this, we can
contribute to know what changes in the transit institution should be done, if it is necessary to decrease
the amount on fines, or change the payment procedure. Also if it is necessary to increase policeman
salary or use internal controls to change institutions behavior on one side, and on the other side if a more
equal income distribution can contribute to comply with state's requirements and payments without
using administrative corruption.
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Appendix
Chihuahua
Renewal registration payment example. Chihuahua government webpage
http://www.chihuahua.gob.mx/principal/Plantilla5.asp?cve_Noticia=9746&Portal=Principal

Transit fines example. Chihuahua government web page
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Morelos
Renewal registration payment example. Morelos government webpage
http://www.movilidadytransporte.morelos.gob.mx/
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http://www.movilidadytransporte.morelos.gob.mx/pagook.php

Quintana Roo
Renewal registration payment example. Quintana Roo's government webpage
http://www.tenencias.gob.mx/
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Cancun's government web page.
http://cancun.gob.mx/servicios/catalogo-de-servicios/

Yucatán
Yucatán Renewal registry
http://www.yucatan.gob.mx/servicios/ver_servicio.php?id=1
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Transit Fines
http://www.yucatan.gob.mx/servicios/ver_servicio.php?id=13

Driver's License
http://www.yucatan.gob.mx/servicios/ver_servicio.php?id=3
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Aguascalientes
http://eservicios.aguascalientes.gob.mx/contribuciones/default.aspx?opcion=CapturaPlaca.aspxalientes
renewal registry

Transit Fines Local Government
http://www.ags.gob.mx/servicios2/multas.aspx

58

Baja California
Baja California, Renewal Registry
https://placas.ebajacalifornia.gob.mx/Placas/index.jsp

Drivers License
https://www2.ebajacalifornia.gob.mx/Tramites/licencias.jsp
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Transit Fines
http://www.mexicali.gob.mx/apiTesoreria/multas.jsp

Coahuila
Coahuila Car's Registry
http://www.pagafacil.gob.mx/e-pago/cv/principal_cv.php
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Drivers License
http://www.pagafacil.gob.mx/epago/licencias/licencias_conducir.php

Saltillo'sGovernment Web Page.
http://www.saltillo.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=featured&Itemid=101
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